Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? by Becker, Sascha O. & Fetzer, Thiemo
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Becker, Sascha O. and Fetzer, Thiemo (2018) Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? 
Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Department of Economics. Warwick 
economics research papers series (WERPS) (1160). 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/100710     
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here is a working paper or pre-print that may be later published 
elsewhere.  If a published version is known of, the above WRAP url will contain details on 
finding it. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Warwick Economics Research Papers 
 
 
 
ISSN 2059-4283 (online) 
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)  
 
 
Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? 
 
 
Sascha O. Becker & Thiemo Fetzer 
 
 
March 2018                    No: 1160 
 
 
Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? ∗
Sascha O. Becker Thiemo Fetzer
March 29, 2018
Abstract
The outcome of the UK’s Brexit Referendum has been blamed on political
factors, such as concerns about sovereignty, and economic factors such as mi-
gration, and trade integration. Analyses of the cross-sectional referendum vot-
ing pattern cannot explain how anti-EU sentiment built up over time. Since
UKIP votes in the 2014 EU Parliament elections are the single most impor-
tant predictor of the Vote Leave share, understanding the rise of UKIP might
help to explain the role of political and economic factors in the build-up of
Brexit. This paper presents new stylized facts suggesting that UKIP votes in
local, national and European elections picked up dramatically in areas with
weak socio-economic fundamentals, but only after 2010, at the expense of the
Conservatives, and partly also Labour. The timing suggests that the Govern-
ment’s austerity measures might have been a crucial trigger that helped to
convert economic grievances into UKIP votes, putting increasing pressure on
the Conservatives to hold the EU Referendum.
Keywords: Political Economy, Austerity, Globalization, Voting, EU
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1 Introduction
Trump’s election as US President and Brexit have been cast as manifestations of
the political cost of globalization. Autor et al. (2016), Che et al. (2017), Colantone
and Stanig (2017) and Dippel et al. (2015) present evidence suggesting that trade
integration with China and other low income countries was an important causal
driver for electoral outcomes in the US, the UK and Germany. But since each of
these countries experienced significantly different domestic economic and political
developments, each country merits special attention.
Why did the UK hold an EU Referendum? Why did it take place in 2016
and not before? Cross sectional analyses of the Brexit vote pattern cannot give
an answer to these central questions.1 The evolution of the political landscape
in the UK over time in relation to longer-standing economic developments such
as trade integration, migration and structural transformation may be of particular
relevance to understanding both why the EU referendum took place when it did
and why it culminated in a victory for the Leave side.
In this paper, we highlight dramatic changes in the political landscape in the
UK in the years 2010 - 2015. We collect novel data on the universe of all elections
in the UK between 2000-2015 prior to the referendum. In particular, data on local
council elections gives us high frequency annual variation across the UK due to
the rotating fashion by which councillors get elected. We focus on the electoral
performance of the UK Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP vote shares in the 2014
EP elections have been identified as the single most important correlate of support
for Leave in several thorough cross-sectional analyses of the referendum results
(see Becker et al., 2017; Goodwin and Heath, 2016 and Figure 1).2 We document
that the EU referendum was precipitated by a dramatic expansion in electoral
1Carl et al. (2017) pose a somewhat related question asking why the UK (of all EU countries)
voted to leave, and why not sooner than 2016. Their focus is on variation across countries over time.
2See Hobolt and de Vries (2016) for an EU-wide study of the impact of the crisis on the Eu-
rosceptic vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections.
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support for UKIP in places with weak socio-economic fundamentals. For instance,
regions with a larger baseline share of residents in ‘routine jobs’, with a larger
share of ‘low-educated’, and with higher employment shares in sectors that are
considered most vulnerable to competition from manufacturing goods imports,
structural transformation, automation and competition from low skill migrants all
see an acceleration in support for UKIP, yet only after 2010.
The observation that political support for UKIP grew only distinctly after 2010
is crucial to qualify observations made by important contributions in the existing
literature. Factors such as import competition (Colantone and Stanig, 2017) and the
globalization-induced growth in job insecurity (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004), off-
shoring (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), structural transformation (Roger-
son, 2008), the rise of automation (Graetz and Michaels, 2018) and most migration
processes are generally seen as secular economic trends. Hence, one would expect
any political fallout from these processes to evolve slowly, especially if the econ-
omy and the welfare state are sufficiently able to accommodate those losing out
from such major trends, either through providing employment in other sectors,
through retraining or skilling-up, or through provision of transfer payments.
Where are UKIP voters coming from? Within the same difference-in-differences
estimation, we document that the growth of UKIP votes after 2010 came mostly at
the expense of the Conservative Party and to a lesser extent also at the expense
of Labour. This coincides with earlier cross-sectional work suggesting that UKIP
drew its supporters from two pools of voters: more affluent and middle-class
“strategic defectors” from the Conservative party who identify with UKIP’s Eu-
roskeptic platform, while also attracting economically struggling, working-class
voters from traditional Labour backgrounds (see Ford et al., 2012). For the lat-
ter, Ford et al. (2012) document that economic concerns and general measures of
Euroskepticism are closely correlated. The observation that UKIP was eroding
popular support for the Conservatives suggests that the risk of splitting voters be-
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tween UKIP and the Conservatives could give rise to electoral gains for Labour in
contested constituencies, which is one prominent explanation why the Conserva-
tive party adopted a more Euroskeptic platform early on to try to prevent being
further cannabilized by UKIP.
What could explain the rapid growth in support for UKIP after 2010 in areas
with weak socio-economic fundamentals? In the wake of the global financial crisis,
the coalition government that came to power in 2010 introduced wide-ranging
austerity measures to reduce government spending at all levels of government.
This resulted in an unprecedented withdrawal of the welfare state. At the level
of local authority districts, which are responsible for administering most welfare
programs and provide many services, spending per person is estimated to have
fallen by 23.4% in real terms between 2010 and 2015, with the sharpest cuts in the
poorest areas (Innes and Tetlow, 2015) due to the mechanics of most of the cuts.
Our paper suggests that the temporal link between vulnerability to globalization,
austerity and UKIP votes is suggestive enough to encourage further research to
disentangle the relative importance of either channel.
Our observations are complementary to the existing literature that suggests that
Brexit and the wider political developments across the Western World may be a
direct response to the pressures afforded by globalization. While a functioning
welfare state can cushion the negative effects of globalization through transfer
payments to the globalization losers, welfare cuts may do the opposite. Our obser-
vation that growth in support for UKIP was concentrated after 2010, and in areas
with weak fundamentals most vulnerable to austerity and globalization, suggests
that these austerity policies after 2010 may have been a crucial activating factor that
converted existing grievances into a political backlash driving voters to UKIP.3 The
3Previous work looked at related aspects, but as far as we are aware did not look at both the
interaction of globalization shocks and austerity and the timing sequence, i.e. did not address the
activating aspect of austerity. Ponticelli and Voth (2017) show that budget cuts in Europe are related
to social unrest, while Galofre´-Vila` et al. (2017) document that austerity is associated with the rise
of the Nazi party; Rodrik (2017) suggests that austerity may be a contributing factor to the political
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rapid rise of UKIP put significant pressure on the Conservative Party culminating
in a Referendum “to settle the issue of British EU membership for a generation”.
The next section gives a brief overview of the UK’s relationship with the EU
and presents our data. Section 3 presents stylized facts on correlates and timing of
UKIP’s political ascent. Section 4 discussed where UKIP voters came from. Section
5 highlights how the existing literature can or cannot explain those and proposes
austerity as a key factor. Section 6 concludes.
2 Context and data
The Brexit vote is potentially a watershed moment in post-WWII history. A brief
historical overview will give context, before we present our data sources.
2.1 The EU Referendum
Calls for an EU Referendum go back to at least the 1990s.4 UKIP became the only
single-issue party campaigning to leave the EU in 1997 and began its gradual elec-
toral ascent into a political rival to the right of the Conservative party (Lynch and
Whitaker, 2013).5 Electoral pressures from UKIP induced Conservatives to adopt
anti-EU stances: in March 2009, the Conservatives left the centre-right block in the
European Parliament to join forces with a group of right wing parties, while the
2010 Conservative manifesto set out ‘to bring back key powers over legal rights,
criminal justice and social and employment legislation to the UK.’ Despite the
Conservative party’s adoption of Euroskeptic tones, UKIP expanded its political
support base in local and EP elections, continuing to attract defectors from the
Conservatives (Webb and Bale, 2014) and economically marginalized voters that
backlash against globalization. Colantone and Stanig (2017) consider an interaction term of their
import shock with a measure of fiscal cuts, but cannot tackle the timing.
4A more detailed discussion is relegated to Appendix A.3.
5In European Parliament elections, UKIP might have benefited from closed-list (instead of open-
list) competition (Blumenau et al., 2017).
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historically supported Labour (Ford et al., 2012). UKIP was a significant elec-
toral force in European Elections already in 2004 and 2009, achieving around 16-
17% of the popular vote, just tailing the Conservative party. In October 2012,
David Cameron lost a Westminster vote on his proposed real-term freeze to the
EU Budget, when 53 Conservative Party rebels (some of whom would later defect
to UKIP) joined Labour in voting in favour of nominal freezes. At the same time
polling data confirmed the continued rising ascent of UKIP threatening Westmin-
ster constituencies (see Appendix Figure A1). In January 2013, David Cameron
announced that he would seek to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s EU member-
ship to be followed by an in-out referendum in case of a Conservative victory in
the 2015 general election. We will show that UKIP’s ascent came mostly at the
expense of the Conservative party (and partly at the expense of Labour), and al-
ready started prior to the 2013 EU referendum announcement in areas with weak
socio-economic fundamentals and continued all the way up to 2015. In the run-up
to the 2015 general election, David Cameron pledged to concretely hold an EU
referendum by the end of 2017. After winning the 2015 election, he set out to rene-
gotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU. In February 2016, Cameron felt to have
achieved enough to be able to call and win a referendum. However, the Leave side
won the Referendum on 23 June 2016,6 and UKIP achieved what it was founded
for and started its ongoing electoral decline.
2.2 Support for UKIP to proxy for anti-EU sentiment
Measuring the growth in popular support for UKIP specifically and the evolution
of political preferences more generally at a regionally disaggregated level and over
time is challenging. National elections yield infrequent measures of revealed polit-
ical preferences, and the first-past-the-post electoral system favors the two biggest
parties, the Conservatives and Labour, and is not well suited to capture protest
6For the role of campaign effects, see Goodwin et al. (2018).
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voting. A further challenge with Westminster elections are changing constituency
boundaries, which can only be linked over time under strong assumptions. We
therefore draw on annual data on local council election results, yet, all our results
are robust to using the Westminster or EP elections.
Local election data A key contribution of our work is that we collected data on
all local council elections across England and Wales between 2000 - 2015. There
are some local council elections in any given year somewhere across the UK, as
councillors are elected in a rotating fashion. This makes local elections suitable as
higher-frequency measures of political preferences across locations. We use UKIP
vote shares gained in local council elections as our central outcome variable.7
British Election Study (BES) Micro-data from the cross-sectional BES conducted
around the 2005, 2010 and 2015 general elections allow us to validate that UKIP
political leanings are strong measures of anti-EU and anti-globalization sentiment.
Table 1 shows that UKIP voters are far more likely to be Euroskeptic and to blame
immigration for local labour market problems. UKIP voters more strongly disap-
prove of British EU membership (panel A), are more likely to blame the EU for UK
debt (panel B), think that the EU poses a threat to British sovereignty (panel C),
oppose immigration (panel D), see immigrants as taking jobs from natives (panel
E), complain that too many immigrants have been let into the UK (panel F) and
believe that immigrants increase crime rates (panel G).
2.3 Other data
We collect socio-economic characteristics at the level of local authority districts
from UK Census Data in 2001, our baseline year. Variables are shares of the
7Appendix A.2 provides more institutional background; results are robust to using a balanced
panel of council elections contested by UKIP, see Appendix Figure A6.
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resident population with different qualification levels (e.g. ‘low education’), oc-
cupation profiles (e.g. ‘routine jobs’) and employment shares in different sectors
of the economy. All of these variables can be used to describe local areas that
are economically more vulnerable, e.g. to globalization pressures. Similarly, we
obtain data from the Department for Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study cov-
ering 2000 to 2015 to measure an area’s reliance on the welfare state. We provide
summary statistics and further detail in Appendix A.1.
3 Correlates and timing of UKIP’s political ascent
We first document how weak socio-economic fundamentals affected support for
UKIP over time.
Empirical specification We use the following non-parametric difference-in-differences
design:
yirt = αi + βrt +∑
t
γt × Xi,baseline + eirt (1)
where yirt denotes UKIP vote shares and αi captures local authority district
fixed effects that absorb any location-specific political preferences or sentiment.
Region-by-time fixed effects βrt capture non-linear time trends specific to each of
the eleven NUTS1 regions in England and Wales. Our main coefficients of interest
are the interaction effects between a (fixed) baseline socio-economic characteristic
Xi,baseline interacted with a set of year fixed effects. We plot out the estimated
coefficients γˆt over time to capture how UKIP differentially gained support over
time. Throughout, standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Human capital Figure 2, Panel A shows that UKIP support gradually trends
up as a function of the share of the resident population with low educational at-
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tainment. However, the trend markedly changes after 2010, when UKIP support
sharply rises in local authority districts with a higher population share with low
educational attainment. Appendix Figure A3 shows a richer set of plots for six
distinct qualification groups. Looking at magnitudes, for example, the year 2015
coefficient for the interaction with the No Qualification measure is 0.675, suggest-
ing that the average local authority area with 28.5% of the resident population
having no qualifications saw an increase in UKIP’s vote share in local elections
by 19.2 percentage points. This stands out: the UKIP average vote share over the
years 2000–2015 is only 4.4%, but reaches highs up to 44.26%.
Socio-economic status Panel B of Figure 2 looks at routine jobs as per the Census
socio-economic status classification system: UKIP support is virtually not statisti-
cally associated with the share of the resident population working in routine jobs
prior to 2010, after which the correlation becomes sharply stronger. Appendix
Figure A4 shows a richer set of plots for the eight distinct status groups. The
results suggest that support for UKIP dramatically grew in a fashion that is cor-
related with the prevalence of a local economy that may be particularly vulner-
able to a range of trends (some of which fostered by globalization) such as im-
port competition (Colantone and Stanig, 2017), offshoring (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008), structural transformation (Rogerson, 2008), automation (Graetz
and Michaels, 2018) and low skilled migration (Borjas, 2003).
Local economic structure Finally, Panels C and D of Figure 2 look at retail and
manufacturing employment. The manufacturing sector is of interest because of its
global trade exposure and is particularly relevant as an area’s exposure to import
competition is generally computed using baseline manufacturing sub-sector spe-
cific employment shares. Retail is a sector represented all across the country that is
not (as much) subject to global trade exposure but provides relatively low quality
jobs and is subject to structural transformation due to the trend towards electronic
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commerce. Areas with larger employment shares in Retail, and Manufacturing
saw significant increases in electoral support for UKIP after 2010. Appendix Figure
A5 presents a broader set of sectors, suggesting that no trend patterns emerge for
areas that have a sizable Health Care or Hotel & Accommodation sector. Similar
positive effects on UKIP are found for the Transportation and Construction sectors,
while the opposite direction shows up for Education and Real Estate. It is natu-
ral for some sectors to have opposite trends since sector shares add up to 100%.
Again, the remarkable observation is the changing UKIP support pattern from 2010
onwards. To get a sense of the magnitude, for the Manufacturing sector (ca. 15.4%
of employment in 2001), the point estimate of 0.53 in 2015 suggests that the aver-
age area saw an expansion in support for UKIP by 2015 by 8.1 percentage points.
The fact that UKIP votes also respond, after 2010, to the retail employment share
suggests that the underlying causal drivers behind the EU referendum vote may
go beyond an area’s exposure to import competition from low income countries.
Robustness The observed patterns are robust: we find similar results with spec-
ifications controlling for more or less demanding time-fixed effects (see Appendix
Figures A7 and A8) and to alternative ways of measuring the baseline qualification
or employment profiles. In particular, one relevant dimension may be to zoom in
on e.g. the qualification profile only of the UK-born resident population as op-
posed to the qualification profile of the overall resident population. This exercise
serves to zoom in on the likely electorate, which is most likely drawn from the UK-
born resident population, despite citizens of EU countries being entitled to vote
in local elections. These results are presented in Appendix Figure A9, suggesting
that there are no differential patterns.
Lastly, we highlight that our results are robust to studying data from the Euro-
pean Parliamentary and Westminster elections that took place between 2000-2015.
As indicated before, in particular the Westminster elections are problematic as the
changing constituency boundaries and the first-past-the-post electoral system re-
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quire us to make strong assumptions to construct consistent spatial units. Yet, we
find very similar patterns with the results presented in Appendix Figure A10 for
Westminster and Appendix Figure A11 for European Parliamentary elections.
We next explore where UKIP voters are coming from, documenting that the as-
cent of UKIP after 2010 is associated with the Conservative party losing supporters
to UKIP, and to a lesser extent the same is true for Labour.
4 Where do UKIP voters come from?
The previous section presented important reduced form evidence indicating that
areas with weak economic fundamentals are supporting UKIP’s electoral ascent in
the short time period between 2010-2015. The EU referendum was announced in
early 2013 by the Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, on condition of
winning a majority in the 2015 election. This suggests that UKIP was particularly
perceived as a threat to the Conservative party.
Yet, the previous literature suggests that UKIP also attracted supporters from
the Labour party. Similarly, it could be that UKIP was particularly successful in
mobilizing voters that previously did not turn out to vote in elections.
We investigate these in turn.
Empirical specification We build on our previous analysis that documents that
UKIP’s electoral ascent post 2010 is driven by places with weak economic fun-
damentals. We now ask whether these fundamentals, after 2010, explain distinct
moves away from other parties by estimating the following specification
yirt = αi + βrt + γ× Post 2010× Xi,baseline + eirt (2)
The only difference to the previous specification is that now, we explore a range
of dependent variables yirt. In addition to the UKIP vote shares, we present results
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pertaining to turnout, the Conservative-, Labour- and Liberal Democrat party vote
shares. Furthermore, due to space constraints, we present not the full sequence of
non-parametric effects, but rather, focus on a pooled average post 2010 coefficient
estimate γ to be presented in table form.
We perform the analysis at the level of local council elections, European Parlia-
mentary elections as well as Westminster elections.
Results The results pertaining to the study of local elections are presented in Ta-
ble 2. The results suggest that UKIP’s growth that is captured by the weak baseline
socio-economic characteristics comes mostly at the expense of Conservative party
vote shares as indicated by the negative coefficients in column (3) across most
proxy measures for weak-socio economic fundamentals, with the exception of the
share of residents working in retail.
There is no statistically discernible effect on turnout, suggesting that places
with weak socio-economic fundamentals post 2010 saw no differential voter mo-
bilization from which UKIP could have benefited. If anything, the point estimates
are negative throughout.
This analysis suggests that the Conservative party, in local elections, was losing
non-negligible numbers of voters to UKIP. This is not surprising, as Conservative
councillors defected to UKIP quite regularly (Webb and Bale, 2014).8
We obtain very similar results when studying the performance of UKIP and
the other parties in the European Parliamentary election of 2014 (relative to the
earlier rounds) and the 2015 Westminster election (relative to the 2001, 2005 and
2010 elections). These results are presented in Appendix Tables A3 and A4.
8For example, of the total stock of 77 defectors who switched parties to
join UKIP, the vast majority of 56 councilors defected from the Conservative
party as measured in 2014. See https://www.lgcplus.com/politics-and-policy/
exclusive-tories-hit-worst-as-77-councillors-defect-to-ukip/5075787.article.
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On the timing Since the EU referendum was already announced in January 2013,
it becomes interesting to see whether the link between weak socio-economic funda-
mentals and UKIP votes is already present in the data prior to the announcement,
in particular up to the 2012 local council elections that were held in May 2012.
We restrict the analysis to the two local election rounds in 2011 and 2012 and
present the results in Table 3. The pattern is similar, but also suggests some dis-
tinct differences. We find the same positive link between weak socio-economic
fundamentals and UKIP votes after 2010. It is statistically significant for two of the
four indicators of weak socio-economic fundamentals: for the share of the resident
population with low qualification and for the prevalence of retail employment.
There are some differences in the effects on other parties: while the Conserva-
tive party appears to be contracting in such areas, the Labour party, along with
UKIP actually stands to gain. This suggests that prior to the EU referendum an-
nouncement, in local elections, a growing support for UKIP is associated with a
worse performance for the Conservatives and a better performance for Labour in
areas with weak fundamentals, suggesting that the perceived threat of UKIP, in-
creasing the risk of a shift towards Labour may have been particularly strongly
perceived in the run up to the January 2013 announcement.
5 Reconciling the patterns with the existing literature
Our previous analysis suggests that UKIP’s dramatic electoral ascent, which came
mostly at the expense of the Conservatives, may be an important reason to un-
derstand why a referendum was announced already in 2013. Yet, the underlying
latent reasons for why UKIP was able to grow into a political rival in such a short
period need to be reconciled with the existing literature.
What the existing literature can explain Exploiting import shocks as in Autor
et al. (2016), Colantone and Stanig (2017), provide well-identified causal evidence
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that an area’s vulnerability to import-competition maps into dramatically higher
Vote Leave shares in the 2016 EU referendum. This is consistent with our observa-
tions: a high prevalence of Manufacturing sector employment is a strong correlate
of UKIP voting, which in turn, is the strongest correlate of Leave voting in the EU
referendum. The correlation between the import shock measure as in Colantone
and Stanig (2017) and our manufacturing sector employment share (as of 2001),
has to be strong, as the cross-sectional distribution of employment in manufactur-
ing sub-sectors is the central input in the construction of import shock measures.
Figure A2 documents the significant correlation (correlation coefficient: 65.3%) be-
tween the import shock measure (and its instrument) used in Colantone and Stanig
(2017) and the 2001 manufacturing employment share.
What the existing literature does not (yet) explain I The cross-sectional nature
of the Referendum does not lend itself to understanding how, when and why glob-
alization grievances affected the political landscape in the run-up to the EU refer-
endum.
On the how, we provide complementary evidence linking globalization pres-
sures to economic grievances, suggested but not explicitly documented in the ex-
isting literature.9 Using the same regression specification as equation (1), Figure
3 shows how an area’s reliance on the welfare state varies with the Colantone
and Stanig (2017) import shock measure. The first measure is the number of
claimants of income support, a benefit paid to employed individuals on low in-
comes. This number increases with an area’s exposure to import competition (see
left panel of Figure 3). Interestingly, the import-shock induced trend growth in
benefit claimants started to reverse from 2013 onwards which, as we will discuss
below, is likely due to welfare reforms.
The second measure we study, job seeker allowance, is a benefit for the un-
9Scheve and Slaughter (2004) relates most closely as they document that FDI flowing into
sectors in the UK is associated with growing job insecurity.
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employed. The trend pattern in the right panel of Figure 3 again suggests a link
with an area’s import shock exposure. The trend is broken in 2009 by a tempo-
rary spike in the number of claimants due to the recession following the financial
crisis, which very intuitively affected manufacturing sector intensive areas most
strongly. The trend reverts back to its pre-recession trajectory by 2011 and then
reverses distinctly after 2013, which again coincides with the welfare reforms we
describe further below.
This evidence suggests that import competition exposure is important to un-
derstand an area’s growing reliance on the welfare state. This is a simple reflection
of the received wisdom that globalization creates winners and losers. What this
evidence fails to explain is why voting for UKIP only picked up after 2010. Further-
more, it is not clear whether import competition is the only mechanism driving the
surge in UKIP voting after 2010.
What the existing literature does not (yet) explain II We next show that, even af-
ter controlling for non-parametric time trends in manufacturing sector prevalence
and import competition, there is still robust trend growth in UKIP support after
2010 in other baseline correlates capturing an area’s vulnerability. We can estimate
a version of the above reduced-form specification, which partials out a non-linear
time trend in the prevalence of the manufacturing sector and the extent of the
import shock by estimating:
yirt = αi + βrt +∑
t
γt × Xi,baseline +∑
k
∑
t
ηkt ×Mik,baseline + eirt (3)
where Mik,baseline are the baseline measures of the prevalence of the manufac-
turing sector in a local authority i and an area’s import competition exposure taken
from Colantone and Stanig (2017). The rationale is that the underlying dramatic
upswing for UKIP after 2010 could all be due to the non-negligible cross correla-
tions as e.g. manufacturing sector employment may be of the low skill type and
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involve routine work.10
Results in Figure 4 suggest that the diverging UKIP vote patters are robust:
local authorities with a higher baseline share of low-educated people, with a larger
share of the workforce in routine jobs, and with a larger share working in the
Retail sector turn to UKIP after 2010, even when we condition out manufacturing
trends.11 This suggests that the growth in support for UKIP after 2010 is not only
driven by manufacturing exposure to import competition, but by a broad range of
factors that are correlated with weak socio-economic fundamentals.
What might explain the surge of UKIP after 2010? Consistent with the existing
literature, we have argued and shown that import competition from low income
countries may be particularly relevant, as it contributed to building up globaliza-
tion grievances in the UK. However, as effects go beyond the manufacturing sector,
other developments such as migration, technological progress, urbanization and
ongoing structural transformation are likely to contribute to the build-up of eco-
nomic grievances. Further work is needed to understand the relative importance
of these factors contributing to economic grievances. Yet, the timing pattern of the
rise of UKIP casts doubt on whether these developments per se are sufficient as an
explanation.
What could explain the rapid growth in electoral support for UKIP after 2010?
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the coalition government that came to
power after the May 2010 General Election introduced wide-ranging austerity mea-
sures that started to take effect with the start of the new fiscal year in April 2011.
The cuts amounted to an unprecedented withdrawal of the welfare state. At the level
of local authorities, which are responsible for administering most welfare pro-
grams and manage a wide range of services, spending per person is estimated to
10Appendix Figure A13 documents the non-negligible cross-correlations.
11Appendix Figures A14, A15 and A16 show that conditioning out manufacturing provides sim-
ilar patterns across the full set of baseline characteristics.
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have fallen by 23.4% in real terms between 2010 and 2015. The extent of cuts varied
dramatically across areas, ranging from 46.3% to 6.2% with the sharpest cuts in the
poorest areas (Innes and Tetlow, 2015). The overall financial loss per working age
adult and year varies between GBP 914 in Blackpool and GBP 177 in the City of
London.
Causal identification of the austerity shock’s effect on political outcomes re-
mains a central challenge: many cuts were applied across the board, affecting the
population of recipients in a proportional fashion. For example, the switch in in-
flation indexing from the Retail Price Index (RPI) to the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) in 2010 is estimated to have cut benefits payments in real terms by around
5% by 2012-2013 already. Further austerity measures reduced benefit payments by
changing eligibility criteria, such as the assessment base. For example, job seeker
allowance was effectively cut for young adults searching for a job while still living
with their parents; other benefits that are typically granted to low income house-
holds, such as housing benefits or council tax reductions were significantly cut
back.12
Not surprisingly, Figure 5 documents that our baseline measures for routine
work and low educational attainment are strong cross-sectional correlates of the
extent of benefit receipt in 2010 (before the cuts).
Our analysis presents the government’s austerity measures as one prominent
candidate explanation for the change in the political landscape in the UK, but
we would like to stress that the evidence in this paper is explicitly reduced form
and does not claim causality and there could be other explanations. For example,
UKIP might have been able to activate votes in areas vulnerable to globalization
grievances merely by targeted campaigning, independent of the actual cuts. In par-
ticular, UKIP’s anti-EU rhetoric in the wake of the crisis of the Eurozone may have
resonated more with individual voters who blame the EU for UK debt and (too)
12Liberini et al. (2017), in a cross-sectional analysis using Understanding Society survey data,
suggest that financial grievances are a significant correlate of Vote Leave preferences.
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high immigration, as we documented in Table 1 (see Bechtel et al. (2014) for related
work). The improved effectiveness of campaigning through the use of technology
may have been able to mobilize previously disenfranchised voters. Similarly, the
political reaction to austerity and welfare cuts may strongly depend on the voter’s
redistributive preferences (Alt and Iversen (2017); Bechtel et al. (2014)), which itself
may be endogenous to globalization-induced individual employment histories.
Hellwig (2008) suggests that an increased salience of non-economic issues in
politics, such as identity, may be a direct consequence of globalization, as mar-
ket integration imposes constraints on economic policy making. UKIP may have
benefited by making such non-economic topics salient through their campaign.
Similarly, the growth in UKIP may be directly driven by the financial crisis and
the ensuing recession. This observation would be consistent with existing work
suggesting that short-lived recessions are associated with political swings to the
right (Lindvall, 2017).
Work with panels of individual-level survey data promises to be fruitful to help
disentangle the effects of different types of exposure to economic shocks, such as
import competition, immigration, skill-biased technological change and automa-
tion. It will help explain the build-up of grievances and how these interact with an
individual’s exposure to austerity. The set of austerity measures we identified in
Appendix Figure A17 together with Appendix Tables A5 and A6 are likely to be
an important ingredient of any such analysis.
6 Conclusion
The mushrooming literature trying to understand the Brexit vote pattern is con-
strained by its cross-sectional nature. Many studies only present correlational pat-
terns. One seminal study showing convincing evidence of a causal effect of the
China trade shock on Vote Leave shares is Colantone and Stanig (2017). How-
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ever, all studies of the Brexit vote pattern take as given the fact that there was a
referendum in the first place, and that it took place in 2016.
Our paper shows suggestive evidence why the Referendum happened, and why
in 2016. We argue that the increasing success of UKIP after 2010 forced David
Cameron’s hand to propose a referendum. Among the possible explanations that
can explain why UKIP continued to surge ahead, even after the EU referendum an-
nouncement of David Cameron in January 2013 may lie in the vast set of austerity
measures that were introduced and started to take effect with the start of the fis-
cal year in April 2011. Further significant welfare cuts took effect in April 2013
and hit areas with weak socio-economic fundamentals, which were vulnerable to
globalization pressures, more strongly.
We believe that our study is an important qualifier to existing empirical work
which is silent about the ‘delay’ in support for UKIP, despite many of the economic
explanations relying on rather secular economic trends that developed over a long
time period. Understanding the full causal chain of the interaction between glob-
alization grievances and domestic politics is an important area for future research.
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Table 1: Validation of UKIP vote as measure of anti-EU and anti immigration sentiment
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: (Strongly) disapprove of British EU membership [2005, 2010, 2015]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.450*** 0.457*** 0.460***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033)
Mean of DV .331 .345 .352
LGA Districts 270 226 198
Respondents 7295 4958 4440
Panel B: (Strongly) agree EU is responsible for UK debt [2015]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.158***
(0.034) (0.036) (0.037)
Mean of DV .265 .276 .286
LGA Districts 209 181 155
Respondents 2019 1718 1519
Panel C: (Strongly) disagree that EU threat to British sovereignty is exaggerated [2005]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.324*** 0.312*** 0.253**
(0.080) (0.101) (0.117)
Mean of DV .31 .327 .326
LGA Districts 104 69 59
Respondents 4296 2454 2204
Panel C: Immigration is not good for economy [2005, 2010]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.396*** 0.356** 0.355*
(0.147) (0.172) (0.184)
Mean of DV 3.03 3.04 3.07
LGA Districts 191 147 128
Respondents 4702 2975 2689
Panel C: Immigrants take jobs from natives [2005, 2010]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.447*** 0.453** 0.382**
(0.151) (0.189) (0.175)
Mean of DV 3.03 3.06 3.08
LGA Districts 190 146 127
Respondents 5096 3104 2795
Panel D: Yes, too many immigrants have been let into this country [2015]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.254***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Mean of DV .73 .731 .751
LGA Districts 209 181 155
Respondents 2019 1718 1519
Panel E: (Strongly) agree immigrants increase crime rates [2005, 2010]
(Will) vote for UKIP 0.293*** 0.275*** 0.260***
(0.061) (0.071) (0.075)
Mean of DV .44 .462 .468
LGA Districts 191 147 128
Respondents 4690 2963 2677
Sample All England Not London
Respondent controls Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Table reports results from a OLS regressions on variables obtained from the 2005, 2010 and 2015 British Election Study. The years in which
data is available for respective question is presented in parenthesis. All regressions control for respondent age, gender, an indicator of whether the
respondent has no formal qualifications, a quadratic in age and an interaction with the education indicator and age. Standard errors clustered at the
Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parentheses, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 2: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying local elections
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 42.746*** -2.326 -25.067*** -0.226 -3.668
(5.257) (4.373) (5.432) (6.508) (6.392)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 70.572*** -8.372 -37.275*** -15.666 19.746
(11.375) (8.452) (11.182) (12.075) (13.700)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 109.098*** -3.445 -41.989*** -36.801** 25.956
(13.794) (8.552) (11.774) (16.580) (16.126)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 24.164*** -7.087 -7.246 -2.400 18.796*
(6.398) (5.710) (7.592) (8.012) (9.786)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 3259 3258 3259 3259 3259
Notes: All regressions control for local authority district and NUTS1 region by time fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted clustering at the local authority
district level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying local elections prior to 2013
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 9.630** -6.431 -21.595*** 23.928*** -6.244
(3.802) (4.616) (6.029) (7.328) (6.646)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 9.723 -15.657* -30.527** 35.622*** 9.399
(7.610) (8.801) (12.041) (13.635) (13.934)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 30.152*** -10.296 -17.581 11.671 17.527
(10.990) (8.616) (12.753) (20.722) (16.993)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 2.378 -4.348 0.212 17.115** 12.985
(3.454) (5.329) (7.044) (8.480) (9.530)
Local election districts 345 345 345 345 345
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612 2612
Notes: All regressions control for local authority district and NUTS1 region by time fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted clustering at the local authority
district level with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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A.1 Main variable description
Summary statistics of the main variables used are presented in Appendix Table
A2.
The dependent variable throughout is a measure capturing the vote share of
UKIP in the respective local election, measured at the Local Authority District
level. This defines an unbalanced panel at the local authority level. The panel is
unbalanced as not all districts have a council election in every year. More detail
about the electoral rule in place across districts is presented in appendix A.2.
The only UKIP seat in Parliament ever came from a defector from the Conser-
vative Party, who then won his re-election in the 2015 election as a UKIP candidate,
before leaving UKIP again in March 2017.
The second main set of time-varying variables is two proxy measures for the
demand for benefits. In particular, we measure the population share of claimants
of job seeker allowance and income support. Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) is an
unemployment benefit paid to people who are unemployed and actively seeking
work. It is part of the social security benefits system and is intended to cover living
expenses while the claimant is out of work. In January 2018, 823,000 individuals
claimed Job seekers allowance.
Income Support is a means tested income-related benefit for some people who
are on a low income. Claimants of Income Support may be entitled to certain
other benefits, for example, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Reduction, Child Benefit,
Carer’s Allowance, Child Tax Credit and help with cost of health care. In the latest
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data pull published in February 2018, there were an estimated 590,000 claimants
of income support.
The data has been obtained from the Department for Work & Pensions and
is available as a balanced panel at the Local Authority District level covering the
period from 2000 to 2015.
Lastly, we rely on a range of cross-sectional features that have been obtained
from the 2001 Census through the Office of National Statistics. In particular, we
have detailed tabulation of the local employment structure, the skill composition
and the socio-economic status of the occupations. These are measured for the
whole 2001 baseline resident population, but can also be constructed to zoom in
on the UK born resident population to give a sharper view of the likely electorates’
characteristics.
The UK census distinguishes between four types of educational attainment:
No qualifications (meaning no fin- ished second school), Level 1 (meaning some
secondary schooling), Level 2 (advanced secondary schooling), Level 3 (typical
requirement for entry to University), and Level 4 plus (at least an undergraduate
university degree) in addition to Other Qualifications, which typically includes
foreign degrees and Apprenticeships.
The NS-SEC has been constructed to measure the employment relations and
conditions of occupations according to the scheme proposed by Goldthorpe and
Jackson (2017). The classification scheme distinguishes two main groups of em-
ployment. The first one is composed of managers and professionals, while the
second group can broadly be classified as “the working class”. Occupations be-
longing to the first group are characterized by their high and secure incomes that
rise progressively as careers develop, by the authority that the exercise in their
work organization and by the discretion they enjoy. This contrasts with work re-
lationships in the working class, which are characterized by low trust with terms
and conditions of work strictly contractual. Jobs in that category are inherently
less secure and unemployment risks higher, with limited career prospects and
most employees are not responsible for the work of any other staff. The two main
categories are subdivided into a total of eight classes.
We measure the share of the resident population belonging to each type as of
2001 as baseline measure.
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A.2 Council elections
The data for district elections in Great Britain is taken from The Elections Centre.
It contains comprehensive data on local government elections since 1973. Since
1999, there have been several changes in local government structure, and these
have been accounted for in constructing the panel.
The current local government structure includes both two-tier and single-tier
components. In England, there are 27 upper-tier county councils with 201 lower-
tier district councils. Additionally, there are 32 London Boroughs, the City of Lon-
don, 36 metropolitan boroughs (or districts), and 55 unitary authorities (UA), all
of which operate on a single-tier basis. Since 1994, there are 22 unitary authorities
in Wales and 32 unitary authorities in Scotland. While most responsibilities are
split between counties and districts in two-tier authorities, single-tier authorities
must provide all the services . In constructing the sample, this paper includes all
election results at the district council and single-tier authority level between 2000
and 2015.
Elections are organized by subdivisions of local authorities called electoral
wards or electoral divisions. Each ward is represented by one or more elected
councilors. Although in all cases councilors serve 4 year terms, there are three
distinct systems of elections. First, elections may happen every four years for all
councilors. Second, elections may happen for a third of the councilors every year,
with no election in the fourth year. In this case, the fourth year is used for county
council elections. Third, half of the councilors may be elected every two years .
In terms of voting system, England and Wales use First Past the Post, while the
Single Transferable Vote system is used in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In the
analysis, a system of elections every four years starting in 2000 is treated separately
from a system with elections every four years starting in 2000. Thus, all additional
variation is taken into account with “election wave” fixed effects, which control for
differences between authorities with different elections structures and sequences.
The main change in the structure of local government since 2000 was the in-
troduction of nine new unitary authorities in England in 2009. These changes
are summarized in the table below. In the first five county councils, the lower
tier district councils were abolished, and all functions were undertaken by the new
unitary authority of the same name. In Bedfordshire, Mid- and South Bedfordshire
merged to form the Central Bedfordshire UA. Bedford attained UA status, having
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previously been a district. In Cheshire, the unitary authority of Cheshire West and
Chester was formed from the districts of Ellesmere Port and Neston, Vale Royal,
and Chester. The districts of Macclesfield, Congleton and Crewe and Nantwich
merged to form Cheshire East. In order to compare the regions before and after
these reforms, district-level results were merged into the current UA boundaries
between 2000 and 2008. There is no concern of overlap, as no district council was
split to form the new unitary authorities.
A.3 The UK’s pathway to the 2016 Referendum on EU member-
ship
In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. This was not the UK’s first referendum
on membership in the European club, as already in 1975, two years after joining
the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor of the EU, the country
held its first In-Out-Referendum. Remain won a comfortable majority at the time,
but Britain’s relationship with the EU was often lukewarm. While the UK was
strongly supportive of the Single Market, and also influential in setting up EU
Regional Policy, it never joined the Euro. In fact, the UK was always skeptic of
the idea of an ever closer union. Already in the 1990s there were strong calls for
a Referendum on EU membership. In fact, in 1994, billionaire James Goldsmith
founded the the so-called Referendum Party with the sole aim of fighting for a
referendum on EU membership. Even earlier, the UK Independence Party (UKIP)
was founded,1 but initially trailed behind the Referendum Party until the early
death of its founder, at which point UKIP became the UK’s dominant Euroskeptic
party.
While UKIP initially may have been a fringe party, it rose to become more
prominent during the late 1990s and 2000s. While the UK’s first-past-the post
system prevented UKIP from winning seats in Westminster, it gained seats in the
European Parliament in 1999, where proprotional voting is used also for UK MEPs.
UKIP increased its vote share in the European Parliament and also made headway
at the local level by winning seats in council elections.
When the crisis of the Eurozone started in late 2009, there were renewed calls
for an ever-closer union of Eurozone members. As a result, the UK felt increasingly
1UKIP originated as the Anti-Federalist League, and was renamed UKIP in 1993
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Table A1: Changes to district councils since 2000
County Council (before 2009) District Councils New Unitary Authority (After 2009)
(Before 2009)
Cornwall Caradon Cornwall
Carrick
Kerrier
North Cornwall
Penwith
Restormel
Durham Cheshire-le-Street Durham
City of Durham
Derwentside
Easington
Sedgefield
Teeside
Wear Valley
Northumberland Alnwick Northumberland
Berwick-upon-Tweed
Blyth Valley
Castle Morpeth
Tynedale
Wansbeck
Shropshire Bridgnorth Shropshire
North Shropshire
Oswestry
Shrewsbury and Atcham
South Shropshire
Wiltshire Kennet Wiltshire
North Wiltshire
Salisbury
West Wiltshire
Bedfordshire Mid Bedfordshire Bedford
South Bedfordshire Central Bedfordshire
Cheshire Chester Cheshire West and Chester
Congleton Cheshire East
Crewe and Nantwich
Ellesmere Port and Neston
Macclesfield
Vale Royal
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strained between the idea of a two-tier EU and the wish to influence the EU’s af-
fairs. The 2010 Conservative manifesto said: ‘We will work to bring back key
powers over legal rights, criminal justice and social and employment legislation to
the UK.’ In the meantime, Euroskepticism grew as UKIP increasingly gained influ-
enced in the national debate. Even though not represented in the House of Com-
mons, UKIP increased its vote share in European Parliament elections and in local
elections across the UK. David Cameron faced mounting pressure from within the
Euroskeptic ranks of his own Conservative Party, and from UKIP, who were un-
happy with the relationship between the UK and the European Union. In a speech
on 23 January 2013, he announced his intention to hold an In-Out-Referendum.
However, he immediately added that he did not want to see a referendum right
away, but only after having renegotiated the UK’s relationship with the EU. In the
run-up to the 2015 general election, Cameron promised to hold an EU Referendum
by 2017. This became a key selling point in the 2015 in an attempt to fight off UKIP
and to unite the Conservative party. To the surprise of many, the Conservatives
went on to win the general election, winning an own majority, after five years of
coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The new Conservative govern-
ment immediately started negotatiations about EU Reforms that Cameron could
present to the British public as steps towards repatriating powers to the UK. After
achieving a settlement in February 2016, the EU Referendum was scheduled for 23
June 2016. Cameron made the announcment saying it was a ’once in a generation’
decision. UKIP achieved its aim of forcing an EU Referendum and has since been
in decline.
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B Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Opinion polling for Westminster elections over time
7
Figure A2: Scatter plot of the Import shock measure as per Colantone and Stanig (2017) and the size of the Manu-
facturing sector as of 2001
Panel A: Import shock Panel B: Instrument for Import shock
Notes: The import shock measure is originally reported at the level of 167 NUTS3 regions, while our manufacturing sector size measure is available across the 380 local
authority areas. The import shock measure was upscaled using the cross walk linking the 2001 census wards with the NUTS3 and the local authority profiles.
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Figure A3: Non-parametric effect of educational qualification of the resident population in 2001 on support for UKIP
over time
Panel A: Other qualifications Panel B: No Qualification Panel C: Level 1
Panel D: Level 2 Panel E: Level 3 Panel F: Level 4 plus
Notes: The variable is the respective share of the resident population in a local authority district that has obtained the educational qualifications following the UK classification
system, whereby No qualifications means no formal qualification or school leaving certificate, Level 1 stands for having between 1-4 General Certificate of Secondary Education
(GCSE) qualifications, Level 2 stands for 5 GCSEs, Level 3 means having 2 or more A-levels (university qualifying), while level 4 or above captures having a university degree.
Other qualifications includes apprenticeships and foreign qualification below a university degree. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross
sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A4: Non-parametric effect of socio-economic employment status of the resident population in 2001 on support
for UKIP over time
Panel A: Long term unemployed Panel B : Routine job Panel C: Semi-routine Panel D: Lower supervisory
Panel E: Student Panel F: Lower management Panel G: Higher professional Panel H: Higher management
Notes: The variable is the respective share of the resident population in a district that is in either socio-economic status classification as of 2001. The graph plots point
estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region
by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A5: Non-parametric effect of the industry employment structure in 2001 on
support for UKIP over time
Panel A: Education Panel B: Real Estate
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Transport
Panel E: Construction Panel F: Manufacturing
Panel G: Hotel & Accommodation Panel H: Health care
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. The independent variables are
the respective shares of the resident working age population in a district that is working in any of the different sectors as of
2001 interacted with a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region
by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A6: Robustness to balanced sample of elections – Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-
economic status, and sectoral employment of the resident population as of 2001 on support for UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. The sample is restricted to only include elections where UKIP ran across districts
in which UKIP contested at least 50% of the races. Panel A uses the share of the resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of
the resident population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share of the resident working age
population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working age population employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of
the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and election wave by NUTS1
region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A7: Robustness to controlling for more demanding time effects: Election wave by Region by Year – Non-
parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of the resident popu-
lation as of 2001 on support for UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of the resident population with no formal qualifications as
of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share
of the resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working age population employed in Manufacturing. The
graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects
and election wave by NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A8: Robustness to controlling for less demanding time effects: Year FE – Non-parametric effect of educational
qualification, socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of the resident population as of 2001 on support for
UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of the resident population with no formal qualifications as
of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share
of the resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working age population employed in Manufacturing. The
graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A9: Robustness to measurement of baseline characteristics - Focusing on UK born population shares –
Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of the resident
population as of 2001 on support for UKIP over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. Panel A uses the share of the UK born resident population with no formal
qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the UK born resident population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of Occupations as of
2001. Panel C uses the share of the UK born resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the UK born resident working age
population employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression
include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A10: Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of
the resident population as of 2001 on support for UKIP in Westminster Parliamentary elections from 2001 - 2015 over
time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in Westminster elections at the harmonized 2010 constituency level. Panel A uses the share of the resident
population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification of
Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share of the resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working
age population employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All
regression include local authority district fixed effects and election wave by NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90%
confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A11: Non-parametric effect of educational qualification, socio-economic status, and sectoral employment of
the resident population as of 2001 on support for UKIP in European Parliamentary elections over time
Panel A: No qualifications Panel B: Routine jobs
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in European Parliamentary elections at the local authority district level. Panel A uses the share of the
resident population with no formal qualifications as of 2001. Panel B uses the share of the resident population in Routine jobs as per the National Socio-Economic Classification
of Occupations as of 2001. Panel C uses the share of the resident working age population employed in the Retail sector, while panel D uses the share of the resident working
age population employed in Manufacturing. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All
regression include local authority district fixed effects and election wave by NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90%
confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A12: Growing reliance on welfare state: Nonparametric effects of weak fundamentals as of 2001 and growing
reliance on income support payments
Low qualifications Routine Work
Retail Manufacturing
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the number of income support claimants. The independent variable is a cross-sectional measure interacted with a set of year fixed
effects for which we plot the estimated coefficients. The regression includes local authority fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the district level, with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A13: Cross correlations between different baseline socio-economic characteristics and the measure of import
competition
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Figure A14: Non-parametric effect of educational qualification of the resident population in 2001 on support for
UKIP over time after partialing out non-linear time trends in manufacturing sector prevalence and import shock exposure
Panel A: Other qualifications Panel B: No Qualification Panel C: Level 1
Panel D: Level 2 Panel E: Level 3 Panel F: Level 4 plus
Notes: The variable is the respective share of the resident population in a local authority district that has obtained the educational qualifications following the UK classification
system, whereby No qualifications means no formal qualification or school leaving certificate, Level 1 stands for having between 1-4 General Certificate of Secondary Education
(GCSE) qualifications, Level 2 stands for 5 GCSEs, Level 3 means having 2 or more A-levels (university qualifying), while level 4 or above captures having a university degree.
Other qualifications includes apprenticeships and foreign qualification below a university degree. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between these cross
sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region by year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A15: Non-parametric effect of socio-economic employment status of the resident population in 2001 on
support for UKIP over time after partialing out non-linear time trends in manufacturing sector prevalence and import shock
exposure
Panel A: Long term unemployed Panel B : Routine job Panel C: Semi-routine Panel D: Lower supervisory
Panel E: Student Panel F: Lower management Panel G: Higher professional Panel H: Higher management
Notes: The variable is the respective share of the resident population in a district that is in either socio-economic status classification as of 2001. The graph plots point
estimates of the interaction between these cross sectional measures and a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region
by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A16: Non-parametric effect of the working age resident population’ss in-
dustry employment structure in 2001 on support for UKIP over time after partialing
out non-linear time trends in manufacturing sector prevalence and import competition
Panel A: Education Panel B: Real Estate
Panel C: Retail Panel D: Transport
Panel E: Construction
Panel G: Hotel & Accommodation Panel H: Health care
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage of votes for UKIP in local council elections. The independent variables are
the respective shares of the resident working age population in a district that is working in any of the different sectors as of
2001 interacted with a set of year fixed effects. All regression include local authority district fixed effects and NUTS1 region
by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90% confidence bands indicated.
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Figure A17: Main welfare, services and tax-based austerity measures between 2010 and 2015.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
2011 2012 2013
First wave of Austerity, Apr 1 
Higher stamp duty  
Inheritance tax allowance frozen  
Income tax band cut  
National insurance rise  
Public sector pay freeze  
Housing allowance cap  
Benefit deductions increased  
Inflation calculation change  
Child benefit freeze  
Childcare support cut  
Maternity grant restricted  
Higher tax credit withdrawals  
Childcare tax relief cut  
Income threshold cut  
 
Third wave, Oct 1 
Cap on housing benefit  
Benefit eligibility 
reduction  
Fivth wave, Oct 1 
Higher tuition fees  
Automatic enrolment into 
workplace pensions  
Sixth wave, Apr 1 
Cap on total benefits  
Council tax benefit abolished  
Benefit eligibility reduction  
Inflation calculation change  
Second wave, Sep 1 
Independent schools open  
Further education fees  
University changes  
End of EMA  
Cap on housing benefit  
Fourth wave, Apr 1 
Rail fare cap  
Public sector pensions  
Mobility allowance cut  
Backdated payments reduced  
50 Plus tax credit cut  
Eligibility for housing benefit cut  
Tax credit calculation change  
National insurance rebate cut  
 
Notes: Timeline of when different austerity measures started to be implemented. This list does not claim to be comprehensive, as many further measures such as the
intensification of imposition of benefits sanctions is difficult to capture. The first wave of austerity measures was announced in the Autumn budget of 2010, but they only
started to take effect with the start of the new fiscal year from April 2011. A short description on each of the measures is presented in Appendix Tables A5 and A6.
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Table A2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Percentage of Votes for UKIP 0.045 0.076 3290
Income Support claimants per capita 0.034 0.024 3806
Job Seeker Allowance claimants per capita 0.017 0.01 3806
Human capital
Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 0.286 0.062 5536
Pop. share with Level 1 qualifications (2001) 0.17 0.025 5536
Pop. share with Level 2 qualifications (2001) 0.2 0.023 5536
Pop. share with Level 3 qualifications (2001) 0.08 0.021 5536
Pop. share with Level 4 and above qualifications (2001) 0.193 0.072 5536
Pop. share with Other qualifications (2001) 0.071 0.011 5536
NSSec Employment Status
Working age Pop share working in Higher management (2001) 0.04 0.016 5536
Working age Pop share working in Higher professional occupations (2001) 0.055 0.023 5536
Working age Pop share working in Lower management (2001) 0.212 0.036 5536
Working age Pop share working in Intermediate occupations (2001) 0.105 0.018 5536
Working age Pop share working in Small or own establishments (2001) 0.083 0.025 5536
Working age Pop share working in Lower supervisory occupations (2001) 0.083 0.017 5536
Working age Pop share working in Semi routine occupations (2001) 0.132 0.024 5536
Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 0.102 0.03 5536
Working age Pop share that Never worked (2001) 0.025 0.016 5536
Working age Pop share that is Long Term Unemployed (2001) 0.01 0.005 5536
Working age Pop share that is Studying (2001) 0.072 0.031 5536
Sectoral Employment Break down
Working age Pop share working in Agriculture (2001) 0.019 0.019 5536
Working age Pop share working in Mining (2001) 0.003 0.003 5536
Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 0.154 0.054 5536
Working age Pop share working in Utility (2001) 0.007 0.004 5536
Working age Pop share working in Construction (2001) 0.07 0.014 5536
Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 0.169 0.021 5536
Working age Pop share working in Hotel and Accommodation (2001) 0.048 0.015 5536
Working age Pop share working in IT and Transport (2001) 0.069 0.021 5536
Working age Pop share working in Finance and Insurance (2001) 0.044 0.025 5536
Working age Pop share working in Real Estate (2001) 0.125 0.045 5536
Working age Pop share working in Public sector (2001) 0.058 0.022 5536
Working age Pop share working in Education (2001) 0.077 0.016 5536
Working age Pop share working in Health Care (2001) 0.107 0.02 5536
Measures focusing on UK born resident population
UK born working age pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 0.154 0.053 5536
UK born working age pop share working in Retail (2001) 0.17 0.021 5536
UK born working age pop share working in Routine Occupations (2001) 0.102 0.031 5536
UK born pop share with No Qualifications (2001) 0.285 0.061 5536
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Table A3: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying European Parliamentary elections
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with No qualifications (2001) 0.363*** 0.167*** -0.166*** 0.180*** 0.000
(0.041) (0.032) (0.025) (0.048) (0.023)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Routine occupations (2001) 0.731*** 0.294*** -0.255*** 0.213** 0.050
(0.078) (0.062) (0.051) (0.083) (0.043)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Retail (2001) 0.779*** 0.268*** -0.322*** 0.067 0.079
(0.116) (0.095) (0.064) (0.131) (0.061)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age Pop share working in Manufacturing (2001) 0.295*** 0.019 -0.020 0.067 0.019
(0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.055) (0.035)
Mean of DV .224 .369 .282 .191 .116
Local election districts 346 346 346 346 346
Observations 1038 1038 1038 1038 1038
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for two way
clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A4: Where do UKIP voters post 2010 come from? Studying Westminster Parliamentary elections
Other parties
UKIP Turnout Con Lab LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No qualifications
Post 2010 x Pop. share with no qualifications 44.816*** -5.424** -28.815*** -8.743** 15.998***
(3.006) (2.129) (2.974) (4.069) (3.295)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Panel B: Routine jobs
Post 2010 x Working age pop. share working in routine occupations 96.878*** -29.340*** -27.619*** -58.484*** 26.620***
(5.396) (3.607) (6.600) (7.960) (6.591)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Panel C: Retail
Post 2010 x Working age pop. share working in Retail 105.018*** -35.603*** -15.902* -81.719*** 23.520**
(10.381) (4.952) (8.871) (11.848) (9.592)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Panel D: Manufacturing
Post 2010 x Working age pop. share working in Manufacturing 42.112*** -20.545*** -1.271 -36.274*** 15.915***
(3.323) (2.020) (3.965) (4.718) (3.723)
Mean of DV 6.03 62.9 35.9 35.8 18.1
Harmonized constituencies 566 573 573 573 573
Observations 2047 2285 2283 2283 2283
Notes: All regressions control for state by time fixed effects and local government area (LGA) fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for two way
clustering by time and LGA with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table A5: Main Austerity measures involving cuts to benefits and transfers in 2011
Effective Description
Apr 2011 Higher stamp duty – Introduction of a new 5 per cent stamp duty band on homes
worth more than GBP 1m, a 25 per cent increase for houses of this value
Apr 2011 Inheritance tax allowance frozen –The inheritance tax allowance is frozen at GBP
325,000 until 2014/15. The tax is levied at 40 per cent on estates over that value
Apr 2011 Income tax band cut –Rate at which you start paying 40 per cent income tax falls
from GBP 43,875 to GBP 42,475 (meaning an extra 20 per cent tax on GBP 1,400 of
income)
Apr 2011 National insurance rise –National insurance rates go up 1 per cent.
Apr 2011 Public sector pay freeze –Pay freeze for public sector workforces for two years
begins
Apr 2011 Housing allowance cap –Local housing allowance rate to be capped at GBP 250 a
week fora one-bed property, GBP 400 a week for four bedrooms or more
Apr 2011 Benefit deductions increased –Benefit deductions for non-dependents will be in-
creased, meaning claimants who have adult children living with them will be hit
Apr 2011 Inflation calculation change –Local housing allowance is uprated by CPI rather
than local rents, potentially resulting is a disconnect with local market rates
Apr 2011 Child benefit freeze –Universal child benefit is frozen at current levels for three
years, at GBP 20.30 for a first or only child and GBP 13.40 for each other child,
resulting in a drop in value in real terms
Apr 2011 Childcare support cut –Cut of 10 per cent in the childcare support provided under
tax credits
Apr 2011 Maternity grant restricted –The payment of the GBP 500 SureStart maternity grant
is restricted to the first child only
Apr 2011 Higher tax credit withdrawals –Withdrawal rate (the amount deducted when in-
come exceeds a certain limit) for tax credits increased to 41 per cent
Apr 2011 Childcare tax relief cut –The weekly amount parents joining an employer-
supported childcare scheme will be able to claim exempt of income tax and national
insurance contributions will remain at GBP 55 for basic rate taxpayers but cut to
GBP 28 and GBP 22 per week for higher and additional rate taxpayers respectively
Apr 2011 Income threshold cut –The second income threshold for the family element of the
child tax credit falls from GBP 50,000 to GBP 40,000. The baby element, which was
worth up to GBP 545 to families with a new baby, is abolished
Sep 2011 Free schools open –The opening of free schools will cause debate about capital cuts
to rest of schools estate
Sep 2011 Further education fees –People on ”non-active” benefits start paying full fees for
FE courses
Sep 2011 University changes –Universities start the last intake of the old system in Sep/Oct.
Further cuts to the universities budget kick in
Sep 2011 End of EMA –Educational maintenance allowance, worth GBP 30 a week for low
income students aged 16-18 who stay in education, is withdrawn
Oct 2011 Cap on housing benefit –The local housing allowance rate is set at the 30th per-
centile (the lowest 30 per cent) of local rents
Oct 2011 Benefit eligibility reduction –Lone parents whose youngest child is aged five or
over will be eligible for job seekers’ allowance, rather than income support, mean-
ing they will be obliged to search fora job or lose benefits
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Table A6: Main Austerity measures involving cuts to benefits and transfers in 2012
and 2013
Effective Description
Apr 2012 Rail fare cap –Cap on rail fares rises to RPI inflation plus 3 per cent
Apr 2012 Public sector pensions –Average 3 per cent rise in employee contributions to public
sector pensions; distribution of that yet to be announced. At some point thereafter
a switch from final salary to career average pensions is likely
Apr 2012 Mobility allowance cut –The mobility component of the disability living allowance
is removed for disabled people living in state care homes
Apr 2012 Backdated payments reduced –The period for which a tax credit claim and certain
changes of circumstances can be backdated will be reduced from three months to
one month
Apr 2012 50 Plus tax credit cut –The 50 Plus element of tax credits ( designed to help older
workers returning to the labour market) is cut
Apr 2012 Eligibility for housing benefit cut –Young people aged 25-34 are no longer eligible
for full housing benefit and will only receive a shared-room rate
Apr 2012 Tax credit calculation change –A new disregard for falls of income is introduced
to the tax credit system, meaning families whose income falls over the year will
have the first GBP 2,500 of their new lower income disregarded when their award
is re-calculated
Apr 2012 National insurance rebate cut –Cut in national insurance rebate for defined benefit
pension schemes. Will add to the costs employers face for providing them
Oct 2012 Higher tuition fees –Students start paying higher tuition fees of up to GBP 9,000 a
year
Oct 2012 Automatic enrolment into workplace pensions –Initially 1 per cent employer and 1
per cent employee contributions, starting with large firms. Medium ones brought in
from Apr 2014 and small ones starting in August 2014. Full minimum contribution
of 3 per cent from employers and 5 per cent from employees reached in Oct 2017
Jan 2013 Cap on child benefit eligibility –Child benefit will be removed from families with
at least one parent earning more than about GBP 44,000 a year
Apr 2013 Cap on total benefits –A new cap on the total amount of benefit people can receive
to ensure they never get more than the average working family brings home in pay
- estimated at about GBP 26,000 a year - is introduced. This would mean benefits
would be restricted to GBP 500 a week from 2013, a change thought to affect 50,000
households, which would lose an average of GBP 93 a week
Apr 2013 Council tax benefit abolished –Centrally administered council tax benefit is abol-
ished and responsibility devolved to local authorities
Apr 2013 Benefit eligibility reduction –Social housing entitlements are limited to reflect size
of family
Apr 2013 Inflation calculation change –Local housing allowance is uprated by CPI rather
than local rents, potentially resulting is a disconnect with local market rates
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